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Abstract
Drawingonawiderangeofliteratureandideas,anew“second-generationtheoryofﬁscalfederalism”isemerging
that provides new insights into the structure and working of federal systems. After a restatement and review of the
ﬁrst-generation theory, this paper surveys this new body of work and offers some thoughts on the ways in which
it is extending our understanding of ﬁscal federalism and on its implications for the design of ﬁscal institutions.
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Contrasting forces, some leading to increased ﬁscal centralization and some to greater
decentralization, are producing an ongoing restructuring of public sectors throughout the
world. In many industrialized and developing countries, major programs have been intro-
duced to shift decision-making from the center to provincial and local governments. In
the developing nations, such restructuring has been, in part, a response to the failure of
centralized planning to bring the sustained growth that was one of its major objectives.
Likewise in the industrialized world, the appeal of fashioning policies in response to more
localized preferences and circumstances has led to the establishment of Welsh and Scottish
Assemblies in the U.K., a shift of powers to regional governments in Spain, and many
other cases of decentralization of the public sector. At the same time, we are witnessing a
process of centralization in Europe: the creation and evolution of a new top level of gov-
ernment, the European Union, in the context of European monetary integration. Just what
the ultimate range of authority and responsibilities of the new central level of government
will be is as yet unclear. But these contrasting forces in Europe raise the intriguing ques-
tion of the future of the national governments of the member states (Inman and Rubinfeld,
1992).
In the context of the evolution of the public sector, scholars have likewise been active in
extendingandenrichingourunderstandingataconceptuallevelofthestructureandworking
of multi-level government—so-called “ﬁscal federalism” in the economics literature. Their
efforts are aimed at producing what Qian and Weingast (1997) and others call a “second-
generation theory of ﬁscal federalism.” This body of work draws on several strands of
literature, much of it outside the ﬁeld of public economics: principal-agent problems, the350 OATES
economicsofinformation,thenewtheoryoftheﬁrm,organizationtheory,andthetheoryof
contracts. In addition, research in the ﬁeld of public choice has broadened our perspectives
on ﬁscal federalism.
Mypurposeinthispaperistoexplorethiswide-rangingliteratureinﬁscalfederalismand
to see what kinds of new insights are emerging. To speak of a “second-generation theory,”
however, implies the existence of a ﬁrst-generation theory of ﬁscal federalism (FGT). And
I think it is important, as a backdrop for this exercise, to set out carefully just what this
ﬁrst-generation theory was (or is). Thus, I devote the ﬁrst section of the paper to presenting
what, in my view, was the basic theoretical structure of ﬁscal federalism as it emerged some
thirty to forty years ago. I have, in fact, found it both interesting and useful to think back
to the basic analytical framework in public economics that underlay the early treatments of
ﬁscal federalism in order to put the ﬁrst-generation theory in the context of the ﬁeld (and
economics) in general.
With a statement of the earlier view of ﬁscal federalism in place, the paper proceeds in
latersectionstoexploretheemergingsecond-generationtheory.Inadditiontounderstanding
the new perspectives on centralization and decentralization, a major objective is to draw
out implications for the structure of the public sector, ﬁscal institutions, and policy-making.
How, in short, has the new literature changed the way we think about the vertical structure
of government and the form and working of ﬁscal institutions?
1. On the First-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism
WhatIwillcallthe“mainline”theoryofﬁscalfederalismwassolidlyembeddedintheview
of public ﬁnance that prevailed in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Three major ﬁgures played a key
roleindeﬁningthisperspectiveonthepublicsector:KennethArrow,RichardMusgrave,and
Paul Samuelson. In particular, Samuelson’s famous two papers (1954, 1955) on the nature
ofpublicgoods,Arrow’sconceptualization(e.g.,1970)oftherolesoftheprivateandpublic
sectors, and Musgrave’s monumental volume (1959) on public ﬁnance set forth an active
and positive role for the government sector in terms of correcting various forms of market
failure,establishinganequitabledistributionofincome,andstabilizingthemacro-economy
at high levels of employment with stable prices (in a basically Keynesian framework). A
key element in this perspective was a largely implicit view of the workings of the public
sector. Where the private market system “failed” because of various sorts of public-goods
problems,thegovernmentshould(andpresumablywould)stepinandintroduceappropriate
policy measures to correct the failures. The public economist’s job was largely to diagnose
the source of the ills, prescribe the appropriate remedy, and then leave public ofﬁcials to ﬁll
the prescription. The implicit assumption was that government agencies, as “custodians of
the public interest,” would seek to maximize social welfare, either because of some kind of
benevolence or, perhaps more realistically, because of electoral pressures in a democratic
system.Incumbentswhodidn’tdotheirjobcouldexpecttobereplacedasaresultofvoters’
decisionsatthepolls.Inshort,wheremarketfailureprevailed,therewasapresumedneedfor
public intervention. Finally, I simply note the implicit assumption of the political stability
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I shall return in the concluding section of the paper). Let me refer, with some risk of
oversimpliﬁcation, to this view of public economics as the Arrow-Musgrave-Samuelson
(AMS) perspective.1
In a multi-level government setting, the AMS perspective translated into the presump-
tion that each level of government would seek to maximize the social welfare of its re-
spective constituency. Thus, a local government, for example, would be expected to pro-
mote the interests of those within its limited jurisdiction. In a setting with public goods
whose pattern of consumption is less than national in scope, decentralized ﬁnance of-
fers some potentially important opportunities for gains in social welfare. For such “local
public goods,” local governments can provide levels of public outputs that meet the de-
mands of the residents of their respective jurisdictions. Such an outcome with local outputs
tailored to the demands (and particular conditions) of each jurisdiction will clearly pro-
vide a higher level of social welfare than one in which a central government provides a
single, uniform level of public output in all jurisdictions. I formalized this rather obvi-
ous proposition as the “Decentralization Theorem” in my book in 1972. (More on this
shortly.)
The FGT thus envisioned a setting in which governments at different levels provided
efﬁcient levels of outputs of public goods for those goods whose spatial patterns of beneﬁts
were encompassed by the geographical scope of their jurisdictions. Such an outcome was
called a “perfect mapping” (or “ﬁscal equivalence” to use Mancur Olson’s (1969) termi-
nology). But since there are a number of “local public goods” with varying geographical
patterns of consumption, it was recognized that there could hardly exist a level of govern-
ment whose jurisdiction coincided perfectly with the pattern of geographical beneﬁts for
every local public good. In particular, outputs of some local public goods (such as roads
and clean rivers) can produce interjurisdictional spillover beneﬁts: they provide beneﬁts
for residents of other jurisdictions, Nonetheless, there might still be welfare gains from
allowing decentralized provision relative to a uniform, centrally determined level of public
outputs. The FGT dealt with this issue by a simple application of the traditional Pigouvian
theory of subsidies: the central government should provide unit subsidies (i.e., matching
grants) to decentralized governments that would internalize the beneﬁts. Recipient govern-
ments, in the pursuit of local welfare maximization, would then extend the outputs of such
local public goods to the point where marginal social beneﬁts for society as a whole equal
marginal cost.2
The literature went on to recognize the constraints that exist on both redistributive and
macroeconomicstabilizationpoliciesatdecentralizedlevelsofgovernment.Withoutaccess
tomonetaryprerogativesandwithhighlyopenlocaleconomies,decentralizedgovernments
have only a very limited capacity to inﬂuence local levels of employment and prices. Thus,
the primary responsibility for Musgrave’s macroeconomic stabilization function must rest
withthecentralgovernment.Likewise,themobilityofhouseholdsandﬁrmslimitstheredis-
tributive potential of decentralized governments. An aggressive local government program,
for example, to redistribute income from rich to poor establishes undesired incentives for
outmigration of the well-to-do and inmigration of low-income households. Thus, the FGT
envisioned a major role for the central government in establishing an equitable distribution
of income and maintaining the economy at high levels of employment with price stability.352 OATES
There is clearly some modest scope for decentralized government to play a supporting role
in redistributive and macroeconomic policy, but the primary responsibility according to the
FGT rests with central government. In short, the FGT produced a vision of ﬁscal federal-
ism in which the central government took the lead in macroeconomic stabilization policy,
introduced basic measures for income redistribution, and provided efﬁcient levels of output
of national public goods.
Decentralized levels of government found their primary role in the provision of efﬁcient
levelsof“local”publicgoods–thatis,publicgoodswhoseconsumptionwaslimitedprimar-
ily to their own constituencies. Where spillover beneﬁts across jurisdictions accompanied
outputs of local public goods, appropriate unit subsides would encourage decentralized au-
thorities to extend outputs to efﬁcient levels. I note especially that the focus of the analysis
was on the assignment of functions to the different levels of government. With a proper
assignment and the needed ﬁscal tools at their disposal, public agents at the various levels
could be expected to pursue welfare-maximizing policies.
Th FGT also devoted some attention to taxation in a federal system. The issue became
known as the “tax-assigment problem,” the question of what forms of taxation are best
employed at the different levels of government.3 A basic concern in this literature is the
distortions that can result from the decentralized taxation of highly mobile tax bases (espe-
cially capital). A key point is that the extensive application of non-beneﬁt taxes on mobile
factors at decentralized levels of government can result in distortions in the location and
levels of economic activity (Gordon, 1983; Inman and Rubinfeld, 1996). The view that
emerges from this perspective is that decentralized levels of government (especially local
governments) should place a primary reliance on beneﬁt taxes (e.g., property taxes and user
fees); indeed, in the Tiebout model, taxes are seen as the “price” that households pay for
their consumption of local public goods. The central (and, to some extent, other higher
levels of government like provinces or states) have greater scope for the use of things like
progressive income taxes as part of a broader program for the redistribution of income.
But more decentralized levels of government are better advised to rely on taxes, like the
propertytax,whichundercertainconditions,functionasbeneﬁttaxes.4 Infact,itisstraight-
forward to show that economic efﬁciency generally requires the beneﬁt taxation of mobile
economic units (Oates and Schwab, 1988, 1991; Oates, 1996). Taxes equal to the marginal
cost of providing local services are needed to induce both households and ﬁrms to choose
jurisdictions that provide the mobile agent with an efﬁcient level of these services.
Finally, the FGT addressed the issue of equalizing, lump-sum grants from the central
government to regional (or local) governments.5 Such grants were justiﬁed on both equity
and efﬁciency grounds. They were needed to correct distorted migration patterns (Flatters,
Henderson and Mieszkowski, 1974) and also to provide desired assistance to poorer juris-
dictions. Indeed, such equalizing grants have been (and are) a prominent feature of many
systems of federal ﬁnance.
This is an admittedly quite terse and somewhat oversimpliﬁed view of the FGT. But it
does, I believe, convey the basic vision of the early normative theory of ﬁscal federalism.
However, there are some elements of this view that need further examination. First, let me
return to the so-called Decentralization Theorem. This is the seemingly straightforward
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outputsinaccordancewithlocaltasteswillbeParetosuperiortoanoutcomecharacterizedby
acentrallydetermined,uniformlevelofoutputacrossalljurisdictions.Thepropositionitself
istriviallyobvious,butwhatgoesintoitislessso.Inparticular,thetheorempresumesthatthe
alternativetolocalprovisionisacentrallydetermined,uniformlevelofpublicoutputs.This
is a strong, and not-so-obvious, assumption. Indeed, with perfect information, one could
envision an outcome in which the central government, through its own agents, established
thePareto-efﬁcientlevelsofoutputoflocalpublicgoodsineachjurisdiction.Whatprevents
such an outcome? The literature, both in economics and political science, has historically
advancedtwokindsofargumentsagainstthisoutcome.Theﬁrstisessentiallyaninformation
issue. Local governments, so the argument goes, are closer to their constituencies; they
have a superior knowledge of the preferences or demands of local residents and of other
local conditions (e.g., cost functions). It is difﬁcult for a central authority to determine the
particularpreferencesoftheresidentsinthemyriadofdecentralizedjurisdictionsthatmake
upthenationasawhole.Thus,thereexistsanasymmetryofinformation:localgovernments
know the preferences of their own residents and other local circumstances, but the central
government does not.
Asecondkindofargumenthasalsobeenusedtojustifytheassumptionofauniformlevel
of output under centralized provision. And it is more political in character. This argument
suggests that there are political constraints on the central government that typically prevent
it from providing more generous outputs in one jurisdiction than in another. There is some
sense of equal treatment on a national scale that makes it hard for the central government to
vary levels of public outputs across jurisdictions. There is thus a kind of political constraint
that prevents the central government from establishing a Pareto-efﬁcient pattern of outputs
across different areas.
Thesetwoargumentsappearinvariousgarbthroughawidebodyofliteraturethatreaches
overa ne xtended period of time and beyond the conﬁnes of economics. In his insightful
chapter on “The Federal Constitution,” Alexis de Tocqueville, describing and analyzing the
U.S. system in the 1830’s, asserts that “The federal system was created with the intention
of combining the different advantages which result from the magnitude and the littleness
of nations...” He goes on to elaborate on the advantages of “littleness” by pointing out
that “In great centralized nations the legislator is obliged to give a character of uniformity
to the laws, which does not always suit the diversity of customs and of districts; as he
takes no cognizance of special cases, he can only proceed upon general principles ...since
legislation cannot adapt itself to the exigencies and the customs of the population, which
is a great cause of trouble and misery” (Vol. I, p.163). One might read this historic passage
as placing primary emphasis on the political constraints on centralized provision, although
this may reﬂect incomplete knowledge as well.
In fact, however, central government programs often result in varying levels of certain
public outputs across local jurisdictions.6 Indeed, this is frequently the result of “pork-
barrel politics.” In two recent and insightful papers, Lockwood (2002) and Besley and
Coate (2003) construct models of representative government in which central legislation
purposefully discriminates among different regions. I will return to this matter later, but for
now I simply want to make explicit the ingredients of the Decentralization Theorem–the
assumptions and their rationale.354 OATES
AsecondissuethatrequirescommentistheTieboutmodel,whichhasplayedamajorrole
in the literature in local public ﬁnance, but which I have hardly mentioned in my thumbnail
sketch of the theory of ﬁscal federalism. In 1956, Charles Tiebout published his famous
paper, describing a model of mobile households that select a community of residence based
on their preferences for local public goods. The basic intent of the paper was to challenge
Samuelson’s claim that decentralized choice could not result in an efﬁcient provision of
public goods; Tiebout showed that there exists a class of such goods, namely “local public
goods,” for which a mechanism exists under which individual choice results in a Pareto-
efﬁcient outcome. People effectively sort themselves into groups that are homogeneous in
their demands for local services.7 Some observers (e.g., Cremer, Estache and Seabright,
1996) have suggested that the Tiebout model is virtually the centerpiece of the theory
of ﬁscal federalism. But this, I think, exaggerates somewhat its role. Even were there no
mobility of households whatsoever, the FGT that I have laid out above would still hold.
Even with immobile individuals, we might still expect there to exist systematic differences
intastesacrossjurisdictionsthatwouldconstitutearationaleforthedecentralizedprovision
of local public goods. From this perspective, the role of Tiebort sorting is to increase the
welfare gains from decentralized ﬁnance. The more homogeneous in their demands for
local services are local jurisdictions and the greater the variation in these demands across
jurisdictions, the larger are the potential welfare gains from decentralized ﬁnance. Thus,
the Tiebout model strengthens the case for the decentralized provision of relevant services,
buti ti s(in my view anyway) only part of the story.8
Finally, I want to address a third issue: hard budget constraints. The recent literature
in ﬁscal federalism has (quite rightly) placed a heavy emphasis on the importance of
reliance on own sources of revenues for the ﬁnance of decentralized budgets. Weingast
(1995) and McKinnon (1997), for example, have stressed the dangers inherent in a system
where decentralized levels of government rely too heavily on intergovernmental trans-
fers or on debt issues for ﬁnancing their budgets. In a setting where the ﬁscal system
provides a ready “bailout” for provincial or local governments, there are virtually irre-
sistible incentives for decentralized governments effectively to raid “the commons” and
extend public programs well beyond efﬁcient levels (e.g., Goodspeed, 2002). In the ex-
treme, as we have seen in countries like Argentina, perversely structured systems of in-
tergovernmental ﬁnance can destabilize the public sector and the economy as a whole. I
simply want to note here that the basic point (if not the terminology) is surely present in
the FGT. In the literature on the tax-assignment problem, there is an explicit recognition
of the role that local taxation must play in establishing a proper environment for bud-
getary decision-making. For example, in his early and seminal treatment of tax-exporting,
McLure (1967) pointed out that where jurisdictions have the capacity to export part of
their local tax burdens onto residents of other jurisdictions, there will exist incentives
to expand the local budget beyond efﬁcient levels, as the local “tax-price” will effec-
tively be too low. The importance of confronting public decision-makers with the cor-
rect prices for public goods has long been an important theme in public economics. It
is certainly the case, however, that the more recent literature has expanded and enriched
our understanding of the character and role of hard budget constraints (as I will discuss
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2. Public-Choice Perspectives on Fiscal Federalism
The preceding section, with its treatment of what I have called the “mainline,” FGT
of ﬁscal federalism, has ignored the important contributions coming from the ﬁeld of
public choice, a ﬁeld that emerged and challenged the AMS view of the public sec-
tor in the 1950’s. A central tenet of the public-choice approach is the view that public
decision-makers are utility maximizers with their own objective functions. And this has
produced, in certain instances, a rather different view of the normative properties of ﬁscal
decentralization.
OneprominentthemeinthisliteraturehasitssourceintheNiskanencontentionthatpub-
lic agents can be usefully characterized as seeking to maximize the size of their budgets.
Budget maximization is taken here to serve as a proxy for a variety of objectives includ-
ing enhancement of power and inﬂuence, large staffs, and higher salaries. Brennan and
Buchanan (1980) extended this view to the proposition that the public sector can itself be
envisionedasamonolithicagent,a“Leviathan,”thatseeksitsownaggrandizementthrough
maximizing the revenues that it extracts from the economy. What is relevant here is the
implication of the Leviathan view for ﬁscal federalism. Brennan and Buchanan see ﬁscal
decentralization as a mechanism for constraining the expansionary tendencies of govern-
ment. Competition among decentralized governments, much like competition in the private
sector, can limit the capacities of a monopolist, in this case a monopolistic central gov-
ernment, to increase its control over the economy’s resources. In their view, competition
among governments in the context of a decentralized ﬁscal system with mobile households
and ﬁrms “can offer partial or possibly complete substitutes for explicit ﬁscal constraints
on the taxing power” (1980, p. 184). The Brennan-Buchanan approach thus offers a very
different view of the role of decentralization in the ﬁscal system.
ThefavorablenormativeimplicationsoftheLeviathanviewofﬁscalcompetitioncontrast
sharplywithsomelatertreatmentsofthisissue.Thereisnowalargeliteraturethatcontends
that active ﬁscal competition among jurisdictions can itself result in distorted levels and
patterns of economic activity.9 This topic is currently of major importance in light of the
ongoing economic and political integration of Europe with numerous proposals for the
harmonization of member-country ﬁscal and regulatory policies. Ongoing theoretical and
empirical work is providing an illuminating range of insights into both the efﬁciency-
enhancing and distorting effects of such competition. I will return to the issue of ﬁscal
competition in a somewhat expanded context in the concluding section.
But two further comments are in order. First, as to the Leviathan view of the role of
ﬁscal decentralization, the early evidence was at best mixed; my own work found little
support for the proposition that ﬁscal decentralization provided an effective constraint on
the growth of government (Oates, 1985, 1989). But more recent work has provided some
important clariﬁcation on this matter. In particular, Rodden (2003) and others, developing a
central theme in the SGT and in this paper, point out that it is not ﬁscal decentralization per
se that matters, but what form it takes. Rodden ﬁnds that, where decentralization involves
reliance on own taxation at provincial and local levels, it is indeed associated with smaller
government. But where decentralized government is ﬁnanced primarily with transfers from
above, the opportunities for “raiding the ﬁscal commons” can result in perverse programs356 OATES
that actually increase the size of the overall public budget. More on this fundamental issue
shortly.
Second, my focus here on the Leviathan issue should not obscure the much broader
range of contributions of the public-choice literature (the political-economy approach) to
ﬁscal federalism. This literature has provided an invaluable focus on the structure of ﬁscal
institutions and the incentives they create for public decision-makers.
3. On the Emerging Second-Generation Theory (SGT) of Fiscal Federalism
The “new” literature on ﬁscal federalism is wide ranging both in terms of its sources and
directions. It reaches not only across ﬁelds in economics but across disciplines with impor-
tant contributions from political scientists and others. This makes it difﬁcult to characterize
inasimpleandsystematicway,butletmetry.TheSGTdrawsheavilyontwobasicsources:
(1) Workinpublicchoiceandpoliticaleconomythatfocusesonpoliticalprocessesandthe
behaviorofpoliticalagents.UnliketheFGTwhichlargelyassumedthatpublicofﬁcials
seek the common good, this work takes as its point of departure the assumption that
participants in political processes (both voters and ofﬁcials) have their own objective
functionsthattheyseektomaximizeinapoliticalsettingthatprovidestheconstraintson
their behavior. Ofﬁcials don’t simply act on behalf of the welfare of their constituents.
Thisbodyofworkthusinvolvesmodelingofpoliticalinstitutionswithexplicitattention
to the incentives they embody.10 Inman and Rubinfeld (1997a) have characterized the
FGT as “economic federalism,” which they contrast with more recent models that
explicitly account for political processes and their impact on outcomes.
(2) The expansive literature on problems of information. The outcomes from collective-
choice institutions depend in fundamental ways on the information that the various
agents possess. In particular, in settings of asymmetric information, where some par-
ticipantshaveknowledgeofsuchthingsaspreferences,costfunctions,oreffort,knowl-
edge that is not available to other participants, the literature has shown us that optimal
“procedures” or institutions are likely to be quite different from those in a setting of
perfectinformation.TheSGTisthusdrawingheavilyonmuchoftheworkinindustrial
organization and microeconomic theory that has explored these information issues.11
Whatemergesfromthesetwosourcesisanewliteratureonﬁscalfederalismthatexamines
theworkingsofdifferentpoliticalandﬁscalinstitutionsinasettingofimperfectinformation
and control with a basic focus on the incentives that these institutions embody and the
resulting behavior they induce from utility-maximizing participants. In this setting, the
basic issue of whether to centralize or decentralize certain public activities appears in a
somewhat (but not altogether) different light. Under the FGT, the tradeoffs involved in this
decision were, on the one hand, the inefﬁciencies under centralized provision of public
services stemming from more uniform outputs that fail to reﬂect divergences in local tastes
and conditions versus, on the other hand, inefﬁciencies in local provision resulting from
the failure to internalize interjurisdictional externalities. Where spillover effects across
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outputs is relatively large, the case for decentralized provision is obviously stronger (and
vice-versa).
3.1. On the Tradeoff Between Centralization and Decentralization in SGT Models
In the wide range of models encompassing the SGT, the centralization versus decentral-
ization tradeoff takes a variety of different forms. In several SGT models (e.g., Seabright,
1996), we ﬁnd a tradeoff in terms of local “accountability” (sensitivity of outcomes to local
preferences) versus a coordination of policies under centralization that serves to internal-
ize interjurisidictional interdependencies. In two important papers, Lockwood (2002) and
BesleyandCoate(2003)provideframeworksinwhichthecentralizedoutcomeisavectorof
localoutputsdeterminedbyacentrallegislaturecomposedoflocallyelectedrepresentatives.
These papers thus explicitly depart from the earlier assumption under the Decentralization
Theorem of uniform levels of output under a centralized regime. Depending on how the
centrallegislaturefunctions,thecentrallydeterminedoutcomeexhibitsvarioussortsofmis-
allocations. These inefﬁciencies must be weighed against the losses under a decentralized
outcome where localities ignore the spillovers associated with their decisions. It is interest-
ing that although the models under the SGT umbrella differ in fundamental ways from the
FGT, many of them produce a tradeoff between centralization and decentralization that is
in a somewhat similar spirit to their earlier counterparts. As Besley and Coate (2003) point
out, “All of this notwithstanding, the key insight remains that heterogeneity and spillovers
are correctly at the heart of the debate about the gains from centralization” (p. 2628). But
this tradeoff can been seen in intriguing new ways.12
Let me offer a few preliminary observations. Some of the work in the SGT spirit ﬂows
from a direct application of industrial-organization models to a public-sector setting. For
example, one of the basic, workhorse models in the I-O literature is the standard principal-
agent model. Here, in a setting of asymmetric information with imperfect monitoring, the
principle seeks to provide an incentive that will induce the agent to respond with a level of
the relevant activity (or effort) that maximizes the utility of each party in a context where
outcomes have a stochastic component. The solution takes the form of a contract based on
observed behavior (or output). In an I-O setting, the model has been employed to study the
organization of the ﬁrm, where the owner or manager is typically treated as the principal
and the worker as the agent. It is not immediately clear how this framework translates
into an electoral setting with multiple levels of government (Wildasin, 2004). In such a
public-sector context, who exactly is the “principal” and who are the “agents”?
The SGT literature has handled this issue in two quite different ways. The ﬁrst approach
is essentially to ignore the electoral dimension of public sector structure and to treat the
vertical structure of the public sector much like that of the ﬁrm. The central government in
thisformulation,actingastheprincipal,seekstostructureintergovernmentalﬁscalrelations
in such a way as to get regional or local governments, the agents in the problem, to behave
in ways that promote the objectives of central ofﬁcials in a setting where the center has only
imperfectinformationandcontrolovertheﬁscalactivitiesofdecentralizedpublicagents.In
one such application, Levaggi (2002) makes use of a principal-agent approach to show that,358 OATES
under certain conditions, a central government, rather then providing a lump-sum budget
to local governments, may do better by limiting the ﬂexibility of local government service
provision through the use of a “double budget constraint” which prescribes not only the
overall budget but also the precise distribution of the expenditure of the funds on speciﬁed
functions (or programs).
This particular approach to applying the principal-agent model to ﬁscal federalism is
limited in its application. It basically describes a setting that Inman (2003) and others call
“administrative federalism,” where regional or local governments are largely agencies that
respondtocentraldirectives.Therearesurelycaseswheresuchanapplicationmakessense,
but much of the electoral and ﬁscal autonomy that we usually associate with decentralized
ﬁnance under a federal system seems outside the scope of this kind of model.13 What is
needed is a merging of the political economy and principle-agent approaches (to which we
turn now).
A second approach that explicitly accounts for the ﬁscal autonomy of different levels of
government in the context of electoral processes adopts a different deﬁnition of principals
and agents. In this framework, the electorate itself is taken to be the principal(s) and elected
ofﬁcials to be the agents. To take one example, Tommasi (2003) has recently formulated a
model in which the principal is not a single individual, but rather the electorate as a whole.
He employs a variant of the “common-agency” model to capture the problem of the control
of public ofﬁcials by the citizens themselves. In this framework, a centralized system takes
the form of a single agent (elected public ofﬁcial) who serves the whole population, while
decentralization consists of one agent in each jurisdiction. The problem then becomes the
design of the “optimal contract” involving a reward scheme to the agent (public ofﬁcial).
Theanalysisleadstoaninterestingcomparisonofoutcomesunderthealternativeregimesin
whichweﬁndthatthecaseforcentralizationbecomesstrongerthelargeraretheexternalities
associatedwithlocalpublicoutputs.This,ofcourse,issimilarinspirittotheFGT.Butwhat
is new here is the ﬁnding that decentralization may be preferable even in cases of perfect
homogeneity of preferences across local jurisdictions. The case for ﬁscal decentralization
depends not only on differences in tastes, but on the potential for better local control or
“accountability” under decentralized provision.14
In a similar vein, Seabright (1996) provides a framework in which elections are viewed
as “incomplete contracts” in that certain relevant information is “unveriﬁable.” In such
a setting, “...it may matter very much who has the power to take action...” (pp. 64
and 5). Centralization allows a greater coordination of policies (i.e., the internalization
of interjurisdictional externalities), but decentralized decision-making promotes account-
ability. Seabright gives accountability a precise meaning: the probability that the wel-
fare of a given jurisdiction determines the election of the government. The choice be-
tween centralization and decentralization thus depends on the relative importance of in-
terjurisdictional spillover effects versus the losses from reduced accountability under cen-
tral control. As in the Tommasi model, decentralization may be the preferred structure
even if there are homogeneous tastes across localities, inasmuch as it enhances local
control.
While these models offer an enriched perspective on the choice between centralization
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The Seabright model, to take one example, poses the tradeoff between coordination and
localaccountability.Butitdoesn’tshedmuchlightonthepreciseformofintergovernmental
ﬁscal relations (such as intergovernmental grants). In fact, the absence of such institutional
content may make the analysis a little misleading. Recall that a basic normative element in
the FGT is the use by the central government of matching grants to internalize the spillover
effects of local public outputs. If such grants are introduced into the Seabright and similar
models, it would seem, in principle, that the gains from coordination and the gains from
accountability can be realized simultaneously under a relatively decentralized structure.
The tradeoff effectively disappears.
In this particular context, let me return brieﬂy to the issue of imperfect information.
Information asymmetries, as I noted earlier, have long been cited as part of the case for
ﬁscal decentralization. Local governments, being closer to their constituencies, are thought
to possess knowledge of local preferences, cost functions, and other local circumstances
that is not available to central authorities. There is the interesting question of why this
would be so. As Cremer, Estache and Seabright (1996) suggest, information acquisition is
endogenous–and there is no reason, in principle, why a central authority could not make
use of a variety of channels to assemble needed information on local conditions. But such
activitiesarenotcostless,and,asCremer,EstacheandSeabright(1996)observe,thefailure
of central authorities to obtain such information must reﬂect its lesser value to central, than
to local, public agents.
On further reﬂection on these information issues, there are some quite strong assump-
tions made in the FGT, assumptions that don’t seem fully consistent with one another.
We assume that the central government knows the preferences of individuals for national
public goods, but not for local public goods. This seems a strange dichotomy. One might
justify it on the grounds that acquiring information on national public goods is worth
the cost to central authorities, while (as noted above) the value of such information on
local public goods is not worth its cost of acquisition. Alternatively and less formally,
we might simply presume that central government information is imperfect for all pub-
lic goods, but that central provision of truly national public goods is likely to produce a
better outcome than one in which local jurisdictions ignore the beneﬁts that their outputs
confer on those in other jurisdictions. Pushing this point further, if central government has
little knowledge of local preferences, how can it determine the correct level for Pigou-
vian subsidies for local outputs that generate interjurisdictional spillover beneﬁts? The
measurement of the spillover beneﬁts themselves requires local information on the val-
uation of the beneﬁts. Again, one might argue, I suppose, that the somewhat imperfect
subsidies are likely to produce an outcome that is typically better than one in which the
spilloverbeneﬁtsareignoredentirely.Butthereclearlyaresomebasicinformationproblems
here.
Other parts of the emerging SGT literature provide some profound new insights into
federal ﬁscal institutions. Some of this literature, in fact, calls into question the basic pre-
scriptionsoftheFGT.Padovano(2004),forexample,constructsapolitical-economymodel
in which decentralized redistribution programs are more efﬁcient than central measures.
In the Padovano model, central “politics” allows some regions to exploit others through
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programs can be avoided by making redistribution a regional function so that each region
can draw only on its own resources for redistributive purposes.
3.2. Fiscal Decentralization: The Problem of Soft Budget Constraints
and Fiscal Bailouts
The FGT has stressed the potential gains from ﬁscal decentralization resulting from a more
diverse and efﬁcient pattern of local public outputs. The public choice literature and some
of the new literature (e.g., Weingast, 1995; Qian and Weingast, 1997) has buttressed the
case for decentralization, seeing it as a mechanism for controlling the overly intrusive and
expansivetendenciesofthepublicsectorandforsupportingtheeffectiveoperationofprivate
markets.
But ﬁscal decentralization, as we have come to realize more recently, brings with it po-
tential dangers (Prud’homme, 1995). In certain settings, it can provide a vehicle through
which regional or local governments can exploit the “ﬁscal commons” by effectively shift-
ing the burdens of local programs onto the nation as a whole. The FGT recognized this
issue in a limited way; as noted earlier, the literature on tax-exporting (e.g., McLure, 1967),
for example, exposed the tendencies for decentralized ﬁnance to be overly expansive in
cases where the incidence of local taxation could be shifted onto residents of other juris-
dictions. But the more recent literature provides a far richer and wide-ranging treatment of
the political-economic character of ﬁscal “breakdowns” that can result from the perverse
incentives that may exist under certain quite prevalent forms of intergovernmental ﬁscal
institutions.
This treatment makes a basic distinction between so-called soft and hard budget con-
straints. The terminology has its source in the seminal work of Kornai (1979, 1980). Kornai
employed the term “soft budget constraint” to describe the behavior of state-owned enter-
prises in socialist economies that could count on being bailed out by the state from chronic
ﬁnancial losses. But the term has since been much broadened to cover a wide range of cases
whereeconomicentitiescanexpecttheirdeﬁcitstobecoveredbysomeformof“supporting
organization” (Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 2003). Such entities can take the form of cor-
porations, banks, nonproﬁt organizations, and even entire nations. For our purposes here,
the term refers to regional or local governments who look to a higher level of government
to rescue them from a condition of ﬁscal distress. For purposes of discussion, I shall simply
refer to “local” governments turning to the “central” government for ﬁscal relief.15
In the presence of such soft budget constraints, local governments have a virtually irre-
sistibleincentivetoexpandtheirprogramsandspendingbeyondtheirmeans.Itisimportant
to understand the nature of this incentive. Although the central government may state its
intentions to abstain from any sorts of bailouts, the real issue is the credibility of this claim.
The issue is one of expectations. Can the central government credibly commit itself to
avoiding ﬁscal rescue operations? If local governments believe the answer to this question
is no, then they have strong reasons for pursuing deﬁcit policies in the form of borrowing
to ﬁnance large parts of their expenditures.
A natural way to model this phenomenon is in terms of a sequential game-theoretic
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The central government makes a no-bailout claim. The local governments must assess the
viability of this claim and then make their budgetary decisions. The game at this stage may
take the form of a prisoner’s dilemma (Inman, 2003). At any rate, under certain plausible
circumstances, local decision makers may not ﬁnd the central claim to be credible and thus
proceed under the expectation that they will be rescued from their ﬁscal deﬁcits. The ﬁnal
stage of the game involves the central government, which must then decide whether or not
to bailout local public authorities. Again, under some reasonable conditions, the central
government may decide that it is better to provide needed ﬁscal relief than to honor its
previous commitment to abstain from bailouts.
It is important to understand that in such a framework, perverse ﬁscal behavior is es-
sentially built into the system. This is not simply a case where ﬁscal advisors can rely on
directing public authorities to behave in responsible ways (as perhaps envisioned in the
FGT). The system itself induces ﬁscally irresponsible behavior: it is endogenous to the
system. The solution to the problem thus involves a fundamental reform of political and
ﬁscal institutions to alter the whole structure of incentives for budgetary decision-making.
The issue of soft budget constraints and the perverse incentives they create is a major
themeinmuchoftherecentliteratureinﬁscalfederalism.Andrightlyso.Thisisnotsimply
a nicety of formal theory, but a pervasive practical problem that represents, in the view of
many of us, one of the principal dangers in a decentralized ﬁscal system. Indeed, we have
seen intergovernmental ﬁscal behavior in some countries (like Argentina and Brazil) reach
such proportions as to destabilize the entire ﬁscal system and the economy as well. In some
cases, politically powerful provincial governors have relied on expandable transfers from
the center and the issuance of bonds to publicly owned banks to ﬁnance huge deﬁcits in
their budgets, contributing to major ﬁscal and economic crises.16
The recognition of this problem raises two major questions. First, why can’t central
governments commit themselves credibly to avoiding ﬁscal bailouts? What, in short, is
the source of the motivation for what, in the end, turns out to be perverse and destructive
behavior? In light of this, the second question then becomes that of how the economic and
ﬁscal system might be restructured to get out of this dilemma. The new literature addresses
both of these matters, and I will treat each of them brieﬂy.
The motivation issue can, in fact, be a fairly complicated one with several facets (Kornai,
Maskin and Roland, 2003, pp, 1098–1100). In the Goodspeed model, for example, the
central government, should it fail to rescue the deﬁcit plagued local government, suffers on
twobasiccounts:ﬁrst,thewelfareofthelocalityitselfwillfallbelowdesiredlevelsbecause
of inefﬁciently low levels of local public outputs, and, second, this may have electoral
consequences for central authorities, as disconsolate voters place some of the blame on
the center. There may thus be both economic and political motives for bailouts. Wildasin
(1997)constructsamodelinwhichlocalgovernmentbehaviorhasspillovereffectsonother
jurisdictions. Allowing a locality to “fail” thus has repercussions throughout the system.
In particular, the Wildasin treatment suggests that bailouts are more likely for larger local
jurisdictionsthansmallerones(inspiteofthehighercosts),sincetheexternalconsequences
are likely to be of a much greater magnitude for the former. This is the so-called “Too big
to fail” case (which, incidentally, was part of the debate some years ago when the city
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and subtle. There may, for example, be important “reputational effects.” A major ﬁnancial
collapse by a local government can suggest that central authorities have somehow failed in
their responsibility to provide proper oversight. Especially where local ofﬁcials (perhaps
provincial governors) are politically powerful, they may be able to shift the blame for local
ﬁscal failures onto central politicians who failed to provide needed and expected support.
Finally, there may simply be basic elements of corruption present with standard forms of
bribery at the source of the problem. There is thus a broad range of potential motives (by no
means mutually exclusive) for ﬁscal bailouts. This itself is an important subject of ongoing
research.
In the intergovernmental setting, ﬁscal rescue or bailouts can take various forms. Most
countries have systems of intergovernmental grants under which funds are transferred from
the center to local governments. Such grants, as treated in the FGT, can, in principle, serve
important economic functions. Appropriately designed matching grants in the Pigouvian
spiritcanservetointernalizetheinterjurisdictionalspilloverbeneﬁtsassociatedwithcertain
local outputs. In addition, lump-sum grants to poorer jurisdictions can address redistribu-
tional objectives. But such grants can also be a mechanism for ﬁscal rescue. Through an
expansion of these transfers, central authorities can come to the aid of local governments
in ﬁscal distress. Alternatively, the center can assume local debts or make loans to local
governments to avert ﬁscal crises; in certain instances, this effectively makes the resources
of the central bank available to lower-level governments.
This brings us to the second question. What kinds of economic and political institutions
can minimize these perverse incentives? One obvious response is greater centralization.
By minimizing the role of local government, there will simply be less scope for locals
to seek ﬁscal assistance; they will have less capacity to raid the ﬁscal commons. But this
can amount to throwing the baby out with the bath water. Central governments, as we all
know, can themselves exploit their monopoly position. Indeed, a forceful part of the case
forﬁscaldecentralizationistodiffusetheexploitativepowersofgovernment(e.g.,Brennan
and Buchanan, 1980: Qian and Weingast, 1997). Even where the center does not have a
strong executive element, a national legislature can itself be a loose alliance of regional or
local representatives who seek special beneﬁts for their own jurisdictions. The formation
of coalitions with logrolling behavior in such a setting can easily lead to inefﬁcient patterns
of budgetary outcomes (e.g., Besley and Coate, 2003). The challenge is rather one of
determining the kinds of institutions that can accommodate ﬁscal decentralization so as to
realize the political advantages and economic gains from local control, while avoiding the
potentiallydistortinganddestabilizingeffectsthatcanresultfromsoftbudgetconstraints.17
Let me mention very brieﬂy here some of the elements that the new literature considers
as mechanisms for the hardening of budget constraints for local governments.18 First, there
are features of a well developed market economy that can themselves contribute to hard
budget constraints:
(1) Efﬁcient credit markets in the context of a mature banking system can provide an
important source of discipline for local government ﬁnance. Poor ﬁscal performance
by a local government will, in such a setting, result in reduced access to credit and
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(2) Efﬁcient land markets in the context of mobile factors can also encourage responsible
local ﬁscal decision-making. Excessive debt or wasteful public decisions can manifest
themselves in reduced local property values and encourage the exit of economic agents
to other, better managed jurisdictions. In addition, as Qian and Roland (1998) argue,
competitionamonglocalgovernmentstoattractmobilecapitalcanreducetheincentives
for bailouts by raising the opportunity cost of subsidizing inefﬁcient enterprises.
Second, there are ﬁscal institutions that are essential to hard budget constraints:
(1) Ofobviousimportanceistheexistenceofareliableandeffectivelocalsystemoftaxation
to provide the revenues needed to ﬁnance local programs. Local jurisdictions need to
weigh the beneﬁts of proposed public programs against their costs. And a good system
of local taxation will make those costs apparent to the local electorate and will provide
the requisite source of funds.
(2) The system of intergovernmental grants must function so as to meet its basic allocative
andredistributivefunctionswithoutbeingsubjecttomanipulationsoastoprovideﬁscal
bailouts. This can admittedly be tricky. As made clear in the FGT, there is a role for
matching grants to internalize the spillover beneﬁts from local public outputs. But such
grants should not be expansible in the sense of providing additional transfers to relieve
local ﬁscal pressures.
An economic setting of well developed and efﬁcient markets combined with a fairly de-
centralized political system, characterized by healthy competition among jurisdictions, can
thus go a long way to producing the hard budget constraints needed for local government to
functionwell.However,theseinstitutionsmaynotalwaysexist,especiallyinthedeveloping
and transitional nations. In such cases, the literature points to certain kinds of measures that
can serve to harden local budget constraints:
(1) Constitutionally or legislatively imposed balanced-budget constraints that effectively
make it unlawful for local governments to run deﬁcits on current account spending;
(2) Limitations on debt issues that constrain borrowing to the ﬁnance of capital projects
with careful deﬁnitions of what capital spending encompasses.
(3) Well designed public bankruptcy laws that specify clearly how ﬁscal crises will be
handled.
There isn’t space here to elaborate on this simple listing of economic and political institu-
tions and policy measures. But it is worth noting that the particular form and conﬁguration
of these institutions that is best suited to a particular country surely depends upon on the
speciﬁc political, economic, and cultural institutions and its historical traditions. There is
no simple, universal blueprint here, but there are some useful guidelines. We still have
much to learn about the critical inter-relationships between the market economy and ﬁscal
structure: how they can strengthen and reinforce one another in promoting stable, efﬁcient,
and equitable outcomes. But, as Inman (2003) points out in his review of the U.S. experi-
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political and economic need for local government bailouts if the appropriate market and
ﬁscal institutions are in place...” (p. 61).
Finally, there is a certain understandable, if curious, ambivalence that runs through some
of this literature on the relative power of central and decentralized levels of government.
On the one hand, we have noted the case that many authors, both old and new, have
made for decentralization as a means for controlling the aggrandizing tendencies of the
public sector and limiting detrimental intrusions into the operation of private markets, as
well as encouraging the development of democratic institutions. On the other hand, the
recent literature (and experience in several countries) suggests that a weak center can be
manipulated by strong regional interests in quite destructive ways. Blanchard and Shleifer
(2000),forinstance,arguethatﬁscaldecentralizationhasbeenfarmoresuccessfulinChina
than in Russia, because a strong center in China (in contrast to Russia) has been sufﬁciently
powerful to resist “local capture” and restrain debilitating practices at local levels. This
raises a very complicated and tricky issue. Fiscal decentralization, in order to be effective,
may itself require a reasonably strong central government–one with sufﬁcient power and
resolve to withstand unhealthy demands from lower levels of government. More on this
later.
3.3. Fiscal Federalism, Risk-Sharing, and Interjurisdictional Insurance
Anotherimportantthemeinthenewliteraturehasbeentheexplorationoftheroleofcentral
government in performing an insurance function in the intergovernmental ﬁscal system
(e.g.,Persson and Tabellini, 1996a and 1996b; Bucovetsky, 1997; Lockwood, 1999). Dif-
ferent jurisdictions or regions in a federal system may themselves be subject to imperfectly
correlated stochastic shocks that reduce incomes or increase costs so as to reduce local
welfare. In principle, there can exist a system of intergovernmental assistance that is sensi-
tivetosuchshocks–thatprovidesadditionalassistancetojurisdictionsthatareexperiencing
negative shocks to their economic and ﬁscal well-being. This issue, incidentally, is of great
concern and interest in Europe, where the advent of monetary union under EMU has meant
thelossofmacro-policystabilizationpowersatthemembernationlevel.Membercountries
have not only lost their monetary and exchange-rate prerogatives, but have made commit-
mentsundertheMaastrichtTreatyandtheStabilityandGrowthPactthatseriouslyconstrain
their capacity to use ﬁscal measures for countercyclical purposes. In such a setting, is there
a basic role for the center in providing “insurance” against exogenous shocks–and if so,
what can economic analysis say about its particular form?
Lockwood (1999) has explored this problem in a model in which the central government
employs intergovernmental grants both to internalize spillover effects from outputs of local
public goods and to provide “risk-sharing contracts” among the jurisdictions in the pres-
ence of stochastic shocks of various sorts. If individuals exhibit risk-averse preferences,
Lockwood ﬁnds that the form and magnitude of the optimizing grant may differ from the
standard Pigouvian measure where the matching rate depends solely on the level of the
external beneﬁts. For various cases, the optimal grant will typically be a nonlinear function
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Afundamentalproblemwithimportantpracticalimplicationsthatemergesinsuchinsur-
ance models is a standard moral hazard problem (Bucovetsy, 1997; Perrson and Tabellini,
1996a). When “central insurance” is available, a local jurisdiction will tend to underpro-
vide outputs or programs that improve the local economy’s capacity to adjust to exogenous
shocks. Perrson and Tabellini reach the interesting result that the extent of the moral haz-
ard problem depends in basic ways on the nature of the federal ﬁscal constitution. In their
framework,thecentralizationoftheinsurancefunctionwiththecentralgovernmentdirectly
providinginsurancetoindividualscan,undercertaincircumstances,betteraddressthemoral
hazard problem than can a system of “confederation” with transfers among governments.
Centrally provided insurance to local governments thus comes at a price. To take a
concrete example, consider the ﬁscal pressures on state and local governments resulting
from the onset of a serious recession. Subject to balanced-budget constraints, states and
localities ﬁnd that when their revenues decline in a recession, they must respond by cutting
expenditures and laying off workers. And this only worsens matters in the aggregate. This
problem has long been recognized; in the 1940’s, Hansen and Perloff (1944) described this
phenomenonasthe“ﬁscalperversityhypothesis.”Insuchacontext,itmakessomesensefor
thecentralgovernmenttoprovideﬁscalassistancetothestatesandlocalitiessothattheycan
maintain their levels of spending. Indeed several observers have argued in the context of the
recent recession in the U.S. that the most effective countercyclical program would be one
of federal assistance to state and local governments. But there is an obvious moral-hazard
problem here. If the central government stands ready to bail decentralized governments out
of their ﬁscal distress, it blunts the incentives for state and local ofﬁcials to make sensible
provision for hard times. Most state and local governments try to some extent to build up
“rainy day funds” during good times and draw them down during lean periods. These funds
are admittedly not always adequate, especially when revenues are reduced for protracted
periodsoftime.Buttoprovideextensiveinsurancecomesatacostofinefﬁcientlylowlevels
of preparation. Moreover, the existence of such insurance programs could easily, in some
circumstances, be a prelude to an extension of assistance to regions or localities to relieve
ﬁscal distress from all sorts of causes; they could, in short, come to provide a rationale
for ﬁscal bailouts and a general softening of budget constraints. There exists a real conﬂict
of objectives here that presents a difﬁcult tradeoff in the design of ﬁscal institutions and
budgetary procedures.
Similar sorts of issues have arisen in the context of European monetary union (EMU).
There was a general sense that monetary union required a set of rules for ﬁscal behavior to
prevent member nation policies from undermining the credibility of the European Central
Bankcommitmenttomonetarystability(Franco,BalassoneandFrancese,2003).Theresult,
under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, was an agreement among those nations joining the
EMUtostrictlimitationsonthesizeoftheirdeﬁcits(3%ofGDP)andtheirpublicdebt(60%
of GDP). This was reinforced in 1997 by the Stability and Growth Pact, which requires
member countries to meet a medium-term goal of a budget that is “close to balance or in
surplus.” More generally, as Rattso (2003) points out, the evolution of ﬁscal institutions in
the European Union (as well as the EMU) involves fundamental “common pool problems.”
In principle, to establish proper incentives for ﬁscal choices, each level of government
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to the electorate for decisions on public programs. But this is difﬁcult to do; moreover,
the establishment of the E.U. involves a range of objectives including some redistributive
ones. And this inevitably creates some adverse incentive problems. As Rattso points out,
“Establishing a supernational center may create new sources of ﬁscal indiscipline” (p. 8).
One of the fundamental challenges in the design of new European ﬁscal institutions will
involveaddressingthesecommon-poolproblemsinwaysthatcreatehardbudgetconstraints
for the member nations.19
4. Stability and “Self-Enforcing” Elements in Federal Systems
The FGT of ﬁscal federalism took as given an existing, stable, and self-perpetuating under-
lying federal structure. Within this given structure, the economic literature on federalism
examined the allocation of functions among levels of government and the properties of
various intergovernmental ﬁscal institutions. But, as much of the recent (and some older)
work points up, this is an assumption not to be taken lightly. The stability and perpetuation
of federal institutions, and indeed of the nation-state itself, are not inviolable.
Nations themselves can disintegrate. Some recent literature offers provocative insights
into the nature of the economic glue that holds nations together and the opposing forces
that tend to pull them apart. Economic union can provide large economic gains in terms of
reducing the costs of providing important “national public goods,” most notably national
defense. Riker (1964), a political scientist, has argued that an “external military-diplomatic
threat or opportunity” is “...a necessary condition for the creation of a federalism” (pp. 12
and 13). But, as the economic literature emphasizes, there are other sources of important
gains from nation formation including the facilitation of trade. In their insightful survey of
this issue, Bolton, Roland, and Spolare (1996) point out that “When two nations unite, av-
erage trading costs are reduced since some internationaltransactionsnow become domestic
transactions” (p. 700).
However, there can be signiﬁcant costs in such national union, costs that, if sufﬁciently
large, can encourage secession. In an early piece on this issue, Buchanan and Faith (1987)
consideramodelinwhichcertainjurisdictionsexploitothersthroughasystemofcentralized
taxes and transfers; when the exploited jurisdictions ﬁnd that their losses exceed the gain
fromunion,theyhaveanincentivetosecede.Infact,suchincentivesmayestablishlimitson
theextentofsuchinterjurisdictionalexploitation.Itisinterestingthatregionaltransfershave,
in fact, provided the basis for proposals for national disintegration in countries like Italy.
Butthecostsofunionneednotcomefromsuchexplicitexploitation.Intheirmodel,Bolton
and Roland (1997) show that differences in regional tastes that cannot be accommodated
under a national regime (in their case it is differences in the distribution of income and
desired redistributive programs) can also induce disintegration. Interestingly, the threat of
secession again can place limits on national policies.20
Butthebreakdownoftheproperfunctioningofafederalﬁscalsystemneednotinvolvethe
explicitdisintegrationofthenation.Forcesworkingwithinsocietyandthepublicsectorcan
undermine the structure and working of a federal government. De Figueirdo and Weingast
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(1) Centralintrusion(ortakeover)leadingtothedestructionofaneffectivefederalstructure
through the loss of power at decentralized levels;
(2) The impairment of federal institutions through opportunistic efforts at decentralized
levels to raid the ﬁscal commons and obtain “local” beneﬁts at the expense of other
jurisdictions.
Thereareplentyofexamplesoffederalbreakdownsstemmingfromeachofthesesources.It
is interesting that some of the earlier writers foresaw centralization as the primary tendency
and threat to the stability of federal systems. De Tocqueville, writing in the 19th century
and whom I cited earlier, concludes, after a lengthy consideration of the “inclinations” in
democratic states, that “I am of the opinion that, in the democratic ages which are opening
upon us...centralization will be the natural government” (p. 296). Likewise, Lord Bryce
(1893), in completing his encyclopedic, two-volume study of federalism in the United
States, ﬁnds that the “centripetal forces” are “permanent and secular forces, working from
age to age” to promote a continuing centralization of government (p. 844). He predicts (as
part of this general tendency) that in the United States “...the importance of the States
will decline as the majesty and authority of the National government increase” (p. 844).
Writing much later, Riker (1964) concurs, “...federalism in the United States is likely to
be centralized further as time goes on” (p. 110).
The stability of a system of federal governance is, in fact, a delicate balancing act. There
are potentially quite powerful incentives for destructive behavior that can manifest them-
selves at either the center or regional/local levels. As we have seen, the SGT has explored
the latter in game-theoretic analyses of soft budget constraints and ﬁscal bailouts. From
a broader perspective, the point is that political and ﬁscal institutions have elements that
are endogenous to the system (Weingast, forthcoming). In some instances these institutions
may contain the seeds of their own destruction, while, in other cases, they provide for their
own perpetuation—for a “self-enforcing” federalism.
The foregoing suggests that a stable and enduring federal structure must have, on the one
hand, a central government that is sufﬁciently strong to rein in regional and local govern-
ments so that the system is not undercut by aggressive jurisdictional “beggar-thy-neighbor”
policies, and, on the other hand, adequate constraints to keep the central government within
its sphere. What sorts of institutions can create this kind of environment? This issue is
obviouslyitselfasubjectforalengthydiscourse,butletmesimplyconcludethisessaywith
a brief glimpse into some of the emerging literature on “self-enforcing” federalism.21
Some valuable insights can come from a consideration of failed systems. In the case,
for example, of the U.S. Articles of Confederation (1781–1788), the structure ultimately
collapsed (at least in part) because of inadequate powers at the center (Dougherty, 2001;
Weingast, forthcoming). In particular, the central government was unable to perform three
basic functions: to mobilize sufﬁcient resources (in the absence powers of own taxation) to
defend the country; to provide a stable national currency, and to prevent the establishment
of damaging internal trade barriers. It simply couldn’t address effectively critical common-
pool problems.22
Inadditiontoaproperlyequippedcentralgovernment,astrongandhealthymarketecon-
omy, as discussed earlier, can discipline regional and local governments. Effective private368 OATES
credit markets and mobile ﬂows of productive resources and goods limit the capacity of de-
centralized governments to exploit the commons by making beggar-thy-neighbor policies
more costly. More generally, Qian and Weingast (1997) argue that a properly structured
federal system and a market economy can interact in ways that can be mutually reinforcing
to provide what they call a system of “market-preserving federalism.” From this perspec-
tive, a relatively decentralized public sector in which regional/local governments have the
primary responsibility for providing public services and exercising key regulatory powers
in the context of a common market without barriers to trade and a setting of hard budget
constraints can provide a system with a “credible commitment” to protecting and encour-
aging the operation of private markets. In return, strong markets contribute to the viability
of the federal structure of the public sector.
A critical dimension of this perspective is the role of ﬁscal competition. “Competition
among jurisdictions forces governments to represent citizen interests and to preserve mar-
kets”(QianandWeingast,1997,p.88).Suchcompetitioneffectivelypunisheslocalofﬁcials
forinefﬁcientintrusionsintomarkets.And,insodoing,itreinforceshardbudgetconstraints
at regional and local levels. Thus, pervasive competition both in private markets and within
thepublicsectorhelpstocreateasettinginwhichinstitutionscanpersist–inwhichintrusive
and destructive behavior is discouraged by an effective set of penalties.23
There remains the fundamental question of how to contain the central government in
order to prevent the collapse of the federal system by a takeover from the top. This is
obviously a complex issue. But the emerging (and some older) literature suggests various
constitutional and operational checks and balances; these include a fundamental role for
the judiciary (e.g., Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997b), limiting the stakes of national politics by
decentralizing authority, and an effective party system with strong local elements (Riker,
1964, and Weingast, forthcoming).
While my remarks here are little more than suggestive, the point is that parts of the SGT
are moving beyond a purely static view of the incentive structure and potential performance
of federal institutions to a broader consideration of the evolution of federal structure over
time with attention to the stability of institutions and their capacity to be “self-enforcing.”
A successful system of ﬁscal federalism must be able to sustain itself over time.
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Notes
1. A contrasting and competing view of the public sector was also emerging during this period. In particular,
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) were initiating the effort to develop the new “public choice” approach to
collective action. I will return to this later. See also Boadway (1997) for an insightful characterization of the
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2. The explanatory power of this conception of intergovernmental grants is admittedly somewhat problematic.
Inman (1988), for example, has found that a model of “redistributive politics” explains the pattern of growing
intergovernmental aid in the U.S. better than the conventional economic efﬁciency and equity arguments.
3. SeeespeciallytheessaysinMcLure(1983).Inthisvolume,Musgrave(1983)providesoneoftheusefulearly
treatments entitled “Who Should Tax Where and What?”
4. For a recent and illuminating treatment of how local property taxation fosters efﬁcient local budgetary
decisions, see Fischel (2001).
5. For a survey of the early literature on this issue, see Oates (1972, ch. 3). For a more comprehensive treatment,
see Boadway and Flatters (1982).
6. And, of course, even “uniform” national programs can have signiﬁcantly different local outcomes where they
are administered locally.
7. The Tiebout model, as the author himself stresses, provides a mechanism for preference revelation—a theo-
retical solution (as Garzarelli, 2004, puts it) to a problem of “organizational design.” It solves an information
problem. As Seabright (1996) contends, “Tiebout’s model is best seen as a pioneering contribution to the
theory of mechanism design, rather than saying anything about the decentralisation of power in government”
(p. 63). Indeed, some of Tiebout’s colleagues suggested to me (long ago!) that Tiebout himself never saw his
paper as providing a description of how local ﬁnance actually works–rather he saw it as part of the theoretical
dialogue on public goods. And that’s the way the paper reads; there is virtually no discussion, for example,
of taxation in the paper. It is later writers who have argued that the model has real explanatory power [see,
for example, Fischel’s (2001) recent treatment].
8. This point is of some importance because the Tiebout model is often viewed as describing a peculiarly U.S.
phenomenon; so-called “Tiebout sorting” is thought by many to be less relevant in Europe and elsewhere.
For this reason, I simply want to make the point that the basic theory of ﬁscal federalism is not founded
on the Tiebout model. In this regard, Rhode and Strumpf (2003) have recently provided some evidence that
long-run trends in geographic segregation in the U.S. are not consistent with the Tiebout prediction.
9. For comprehensive surveys of this literature, see, for example, Sinn (1994, 1997), Wellisch (2000), Wilson
(1996, 1999), and Oates (2002).
10. This is the basic theme of the “new institutional economics.” See, for example, the excellent collection of
studies (several of ﬁscal decentralization) in Picciotto and Wiesner (1998).
11. Boadway (1997) provides a rich and insightful discussion of the introduction of “imperfect information”
into the corpus of public ﬁnance. In an important paper, Cremer, Estache and Seabright (1996) explicitly
ask what we can learn about ﬁscal decentralization from the theory of the ﬁrm. In an interesting exchange,
one reviewer of this paper contends that the primary roots of the SGT are to be found in the integration of
imperfect information into the analysis. Indeed, one can argue that with full and perfect information, there is
no need for a public sector at all, for, in such a setting “...self-interested individuals would presumably use
their knowledge to extract all possible pareto-superior gains from the economy because they have a mutual
interest in doing so” (Tresh,1995, p. 19]. However, I have chosen to give the new political-economy literature
joint-billing with imperfect information. There are a range of matters (e.g., Arrow problems, redistributive
issues, etc.) that seem to transcend purely information problems.
12. The SGT literature provides a variety of approaches to modeling the centralization-decentralization tradeoff.
Janeba and Wilson, (2003), for example, develop a model in which inefﬁciencies in local provision have their
sourceintaxcompetition,whileinefﬁcienciesunderacentralizedsystemresultfromminimum-winningcoali-
tionswithinacentralizedlegislature.Brueckner(2004)providessomenumericalsimulationsthatexplorethe
tradeoff between the inefﬁciencies in local taxation and the gains from local provision under Tiebout sorting.
13. An intriguing case where a direct application of the principal-agent framework may well be appropriate is
thatofNewZealand,whichSchick(1998)describesas“governmentbycontract.”Hundredsofcontracts,that
are essentially performance agreements, are negotiated each year among various public agents. “The typical
contract speciﬁes the resources that one side will provide and the performance the other side will produce”
(p. 124).
14. Thereisnowalargebodyofpapersmakinguseoftheprinciple-agentapproachtomodelingﬁscalfederalism.
To mention only a few, see Cremer, Estache and Seabright (1996), Raff and Wilson (1997), Bucovetsy,
Marchand and Pestieau (1998), and Bordignon, Manasse and Tabellini (2001). Garzarelli and Liman (2003)
have taken this issue a step beyond the traditional principle-agent framework into a setting of “knowledge370 OATES
asymmetry.” In such a world, the principal may not even be aware of the full set of possible actions available
to the agent. They contend that the role of central government in this expanded setting becomes not one of
simplyresolvingconﬂictsofincentives,butonethatpromotesorganizationalﬂexibilitytofacilitateadaptation
to changing conditions.
15. Wildasin (2004) provides an insightful analytical treatment of the nature of soft and hard budget constraints
in the public sector and their implications for ﬁscal bailouts.
16. For an excellent set of case studies of soft budget constraints encompassing OECD countries, developing
nations, and transitional economies, see Rodden, Eskeland and Litvack (2003).
17. Frey and Eichenberger (1999) propose an intriguing alternative approach to decentralization that involves the
creationof“functional,overlapping,andcompetingjurisdictions.”Intheirsetting,separatejurisdictionswould
exist for the provision of speciﬁc public services. Individuals would thus be part of a group of overlapping
jurisdictions that would compete against one another in the provision of their respective public services.
This competition would lead to local outputs that are responsive to local demands and that are provided in
a cost-effective fashion. See Reifschneider (forthcoming) for a rigorous treatment of the Frey-Eichenberger
model.
18. For useful treatments of this issue, see Rodden, Eskeland and Litvack (2003), especially their “Introduction
and Overview” chapter to their book, and Inman’s study (2003) of the United States in this same volume.
19. As Rattso reminds us, common-pool problems can easily exist in a centralized, as well as a decentralized,
regime.IntheBesley-Coate(2003)model,forexample,thenationallegislatureiscomposedofrepresentatives
fromlocaljurisdictions.Inoutcomessuchasthosefromaminimumwinningcoalition,somejurisdictionscan
effectively exploit others. Centralization does not necessarily get us “cooperative” solutions that internalize
all the relevant spillovers.
20. This is part of a larger literature on the economics of nation-formation. See, for example, Alesina and Spolare
(1997).
21. In an earlier treatment, Hicks (1978) provides a useful discussion (including case studies) of how federal
systems get started and how they sustain themselves.
22. For a contrary view of the Articles of Confederation, see the provocative case made by Sobel (1999, 2002).
23. BesleyandCase(1995)provideaninterestingvariantontheﬁscalcompetitionargumentintermsofwhatthey
call “yardstick competition.” Because of imperfect information concerning the behavior of local ofﬁcials, the
local electorate can look to ﬁscal performance in other (neighboring) jurisdictions to provide a benchmark
against which to assess the performance of their own elected ofﬁcials. Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli
(2002) develop this approach and provide some intriguing evidence based on ﬁscal and electoral behavior in
a sample of Italian cities.
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